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WORLD NEWS DIGEST WITH INDEX

JUN 18 1954
WOMAN'S COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.
Published Weekly in 2 Sections—Section 1
Vol. XIV, No. 710
June 4-10, 1954

WORLD AFFAIRS

INDO-CHINA

Reds Reject Truce Plans

Bar West's Terms at Geneva

Communist negotiators at the Geneva Conf. refused during sessions June 3-9 to consider a separate truce for Viet Nam or UN supervision of an Indo-China armistice.

Premier-Forgn. Min. Chou En-lai of Red China & Viet Minh Vice Pres. Pham Van Dong demanded June 3 that a commission similar to the one used in Korea* be set up to superivse a cease-fire. They denounced the Western plan for UN supervision of a truce, Pham accusing the UN of serving as a mask for Western aggressors. Chou indicated that he wanted a single armistice agreement & supervisory commission for all 3 Indo-Chinese states.

Soviet Forgn. Min. Vyacheslav M. Molotov rejected June 7 a U.S.-French compromise proposal that a supervisory commission be composed of Asian "neutrals." The Western plan called for a panel consisting of India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan & Ceylon. Molotov indicated in a talk with French Forgn. Min. Georges Bidault that there must be at least one Communist country on the panel.

Molotov told the conference June 8 that the Geneva delegations must take up the questions of "sovereignty & independence" for all 3 Indo-Chinese states and "withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Indo-China." He rejected Western contentions that a civil war armistice be limited to Viet Nam. He said Viet Minh "liberation" forces had gained control of about 75% of Viet Nam, half of Laos & a small but increasing portion of Cambodia.

(Chou En-lai made a speech June 9 indorsing Molotov's demands.)

Molotov, apparently speaking for public attention in France, said the "increasing" total of French Union killed & wounded had surpassed 100,000 and that the war did not promote the "national interests of France." He said the Dienbienphu garrison consisted mainly of "all kinds of foreigners . . . who had nothing to do with either France or with Viet Nam." Bidault protested this as an indecent slur on heroic troops.

Allies Say Parley Doomed

Bidault, leaving Geneva for Paris June 8 to take part in a Natl. Assembly debate, was quoted as saying that the Geneva peace effort was "all over" and "one should just plainly say so." British Forgn. Secy. Anthony Eden told the conference June 8 that "foreign" Viet Minh troops must be withdrawn from Laos & Cambodia to Viet Nam and the 5 South Asian neutral countries should supervise a Viet Namese armistice.

U.S. State Undersecy. Walter Bedell Smith indorsed Eden's remarks June 8 and said next day that the Communists were blocking a Far Eastern settlement on 3 points: their refusals to (a) treat Laos & Cambodia separately from Viet Nam, (b) agree to a genuinely "impartial" supervisory commission for Indo-China and (c) give the commission authority to make binding decisions.[1]

Smith warned that "national liberation" of Indo-China, on the Communist pattern upheld by Molotov & Chou, actually would condemn that country to the fate of Estonia, Latvia & Lithuania. Those states, Smith declared, had been seized by the USSR "very soon" after Molotov issued a statement Oct. 31, 1939 promising that mutual defense treaties they had made with Russia would "in no way imply any interference" by Russia in their affairs.[2]

(Cambodian Forgn. Min. Tep Phan said at the conference June 8 that a Red charge that his country intended to let the U.S. make it a "menacing" military base was "imaginary & without foundation." He asked that Viet Minh forces withdraw from Cambodia to Viet Nam.)[3]

(UN Secy. Gen. Dag Hammarskjöld said in New York June 9: "The whole Far Eastern situation is likely to somehow be reviewed in the UN" if the Geneva conference failed.)

Dulles Cautious on Policy

U.S. State Secy. John Foster Dulles told a news conference June 8 that the U.S. would not "go it alone" in Indo-China unless Red China committed new open acts of aggression in the Far East. He added in a speech June 9 to the Omaha (Nebr.) Chamber of Commerce: "Whatever we do in Indo-China should be done in pursuance of moral principles which are clear & justified . . . and which the American people understand." He said the world economic situation "determines as much as anything whether we shall have war or peace."[4]

Senate majority leader William F. Knowland (R., Calif.) had said June 5 the U.S. should "face up to the fact" that it might have to intervene in Indo-China to prevent the Reds' capture of Hanoi "in 30 days." But House Speaker Joseph W. Martin Jr. (R., Mass.), addressing a Washington meeting of N.Y. Young Republicans Club members June 5, expressed belief that "it will never be necessary to send U.S. troops to Indo-China." He said the Indo-Chinese could "train forces & fight for their own freedom" with U.S. equipment & advisory aid.[5]

Week in Headlines

United States

McCarthy's clashes with Symington, Welch stirred Senate hearings; monitored calls placed in record; McCarthy testimony began.

AEC majority opposed granting Chrmn. Strauss "one-man rule."

Senate passed public housing measure rejected by House.

House committee approved 90%-of-parity farm price supports.

Senate Democrats demanded passage of President's GOP-opposed foreign trade program.

94 unions signed AFL-CIO "no raiding" pact.

International

Molotov demanded Geneva negotiations on future of 3 Indo-China states; Ely new French commander.

Red China demanded neutral supervision of Korean election.

Plans for Yugoslav-Greek-Turk military alliance announced.

Guatemala under emergency rule.

Egyptian Pharaoh's tomb found.

Ely Named French Chief

Gen. Paul Ely, 56, French land forces Chief of Staff, took over top military & civil posts in Indo-China June 8. He replaced Gen. Henri-Eugène Navarre as Commander in Chief & Maurice Dejean as High Commissioner. Gen. Raoul Salan, former Indo-China commander, was to serve as Ely's military deputy.

Wide World
GEN. ELY

Ely was named to the posts by the French Cabinet June 3. He had made frequent trips to Washington to

*Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Poland—latter 2 accused by Korean Allies of frustrating supervision. [See p. 182B1]

1—see p. 181B1-E2 2—see p. 171C3 3—see p. 161E1 4—see pp. 169F3, 181C1 5—see p. 154F3

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solicit more U.S. military aid and recently headed a French Govt. fact-finding mission to Indo-China after the fall of Dienbienphu.[1]

Gen. Augustin Guillaume, ex-Resident Gen. of Morocco, replaced Ely as Chief of Staff. The Cabinet named Paris Mayor Edouard Frédéric-Dupont, Gaullist, as Min. for the Associated Indo-Chinese States.

Navarre said June 7: he believed French Union forces could hold the Hanoi sector of the Red River Delta this summer but it would require an international force to mount a decisive offensive against the Reds.

Gen. James A. Van Fleet, who had spent 5 weeks surveying the military situation in the Far East, gave Senate Forgn. Relations & Armed Services Com. members a secret report June 3 described by some Senators who heard him as "gloomy" & "depressing." Van Fleet left Washington to resume his study in the Far East after a talk with Pres. Eisenhower June 7.[2]

Assembly Rebuffs Laniel

The French Natl. Assembly refused June 10 by a vote of 324-269 to pass a resolution expressing confidence in Bidault's conduct of cease-fire negotiations in Geneva. Laniel then announced he would stake his regime on a test of confidence June 12.[3]

Fighting Near Hanoi

3,000 Viet Minh rebels overran a Roman Catholic seminary in Quanphunga (75 mi. southeast of Hanoi) after a 7-hour battle June 3 with 1,000 Viet Namese regular troops & volunteer Catholic militiamen. The battle was said to have ended in hand-to-hand combat for the seminary building with both sides sustaining heavy casualties. Rebel capture of Chonoi (24 mi. southeast of Hanoi) after a 7-day siege of the 60-man French Union garrison was reported June 4. The French reported strong air & tank attacks on Viet Minh outposts 7 miles east of Hanoi June 8-9 and a 6-mi. retreat June 6 by rebels encircling Phuly (30 mi. south of Hanoi).

The French disclosed June 3 that a 500-member Viet Namese force had been wiped out (killed or captured) by the rebels at Cungsong (200 mi. northeast of Saigon on the coast).[4]

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UN Security Council voted 10-1 June 3 to study the threat of the Indo-Chinese war to the rest of Southeast Asia. Only Russia opposed debate on Thailand's request for UN peace observers to watch for signs that the war might spread. Russia warned that any UN action on Indo-China would hinder the Geneva Conf. in arranging a cease-fire.[5] . . **Philippines & Thailand** June 4 protested their exclusion from 5-power talks on Southeast Asian defense which began in Washington June 3. Thailand asked the U.S. June 5 for more & quicker military aid.[6] . . .**Viet Namese** Premier Buu Loc & French Premier Joseph Laniel initialed in Paris June 4 treaties giving Viet Nam complete independence within the French Union.[7] . . . **Viet Nam's** plan to mobilize 100,000 men in the 21-25 age group was termed a failure June 3 by Defense Min. Phan Huy Quat who said about 10% of the anticipated total had been drafted.[8] . . . **Dienbienphu** nurse Lt. Geneviève de Galard-Terraube said June 4 she wrote 2 letters to Communist leader Ho Chi Minh at the request of Viet Minh representatives because she feared refusal would compromise release of French wounded and felt she should thank him for her own liberation.[9]

OTHER WORLD NEWS

Korea—Red China proposed June 5 at the Geneva Conf. that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Comm. observe all-Korean elections. Premier-Forgn. Min. Chou En-lai reiterated previous Red demands that over-all control of voting be held by an all-Korean commission in which both sides would have veto power. U.S. State Undersecy. Walter Bedell Smith denounced the "neutral" supervision plan as "completely fraudulent." He said the Reds would enjoy a "built-in veto" on a commission half Communist and half ROK.[10] . . . ROK Pres. Syngman Rhee urged June 7 that the U.S. & South Korea quit the Geneva Conf.

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West Would Win War Now

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, NATO supreme commander, said in a London speech June 8 that Russia would suffer "severe defeat" if it attacked the West this year because it had "no answer" to the U.S. B-47 atomic bomber. But he warned that an atomic war might end in victory for neither side. He stressed "the importance of a friendly & peaceful settlement."[11]

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because the U.S. was "losing too much face."[12] . . . Rhee asked June 8 for control of U.S. aid funds for Korean reconstruction. He accused the U.S. of wasting money on "unnecessary administrative expenses." Govs. Dan Thornton of Colorado, John S. Fine of Pennsylvania & Allan Shivers of Texas, returning from a Korean trip, predicted June 4 that Korea would be rebuilt into "a powerful & prosperous ally." The ROK Govt. said June 6 it had obtained about $42 million from the sale of the total 1,815,000 tons of foreign aid goods received in 1953.[13]

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European Defense Community treaty ratification was disapproved, 24-18, by the Forgn. Affairs Com. of the French Natl. Assembly June 9 but the decision was subject to reversal by the full Assembly. 6 Socialists defied a party directive and opposed the EDC.[14] . . . **U.S. foreign aid** (military & economic) next fiscal year would total about $5 billion, with $3.447 billion in new funds & the rest carried over from previous years, FOA Admin. Harold E. Stassen told the Senate Forgn. Relations Com. in defending the Eisenhower Admin.'s request June 8. $1 billion of the new request was earmarked for Indo-China. State Secy. John Foster Dulles told the same committee June 4 that Congressional curtailment of military aid to France & Italy if they failed to ratify the EDC would be "acceptable" to the Eisenhower Admin. He predicted, however, that the EDC plan would succeed.[15]

Greek-Yugoslav-Turk plan for a full military alliance "strengthening peace & collective security under the UN Charter" was announced in Athens June 5 at the conclusion of a visit there by Yugoslav Pres. Tito & Forgn. Secy. Koca Popovic. It was to be signed in Belgrade in July. A 4-day visit to Washington by Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes ended June 5 with announcement that the U.S. would increase & hasten (new schedule unspecified) fiscal 1955 military aid deliveries to Turkey, previously fixed at $500 million.[16]

East German Young Communists staged anti-U.S. parades during a Free German Youth rally in East Berlin June 6-8. East-zone police barred FGY delegates from outside East Berlin from visiting West Berlin.[17] . . . **Georg Dertinger,** deposed in Jan. 1953 as East German Foreign Minister, was revealed June 8 to have been given a 15-yr. prison sentence for plotting overthrow of the regime.[18]

Guatemalan Govt. suspended civil rights in the country June 8 to deal with what was characterized as a "crisis" caused by a plot to overthrow Pres. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman's regime. Discovery of the plot had been announced May 31. Ex-AF commander Col. Rodolfo Mendoza Azurdia and Ferdinand F. Schupp, ex-deputy chief of the USAF mission to Guatemala, fled to El Salvador June 4 to escape arrest. The Guatemalan Govt. gave safe conduct out of the country June 3 to several persons who had taken refuge in the Salvadorean & Ecuadorean Embassies after many Govt. opponents were arrested May 30-31. Roundup of opposition leaders continued into a 2d week June 7. (U.S. State Secy. John Foster Dulles said June 8 he favored a special inter-American meeting on the Red threat in Guatemala.)[19]

U.S. & Chinese Communist diplomats met informally in Geneva June 5 to negotiate the release of 54 U.S. civilians & 29 military personnel held in Red China since the mainland civil war. Five Britons, an American & a Canadian Roman Catholic priest reached Hong Kong June 8 from Shanghai under terms of an Anglo-Chinese agreement.

1—see p. 170F1 2—181D3 3—161G3 4—181D2 5—181F2 6—181G2 7—134C2 8—118A2 9—181G2 10—189G3 11—82C2 12—170D2 13—182A1 14—182E1 15—17B3 16—127B3 17—171B2 18—Vol. XIII, 35K 19—170F3

FACTS ON FILE is published weekly by Facts on File, Inc., 516 Fifth Ave., New York 36, N. Y. (MUrray Hill 2-5523-4). Entered as 2d class matter June 24, 1941 at the Post Office in New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription $55 a year; Yearbooks (bound volumes) from 1941—$25 each. Cumulative Index published twice a month. Copyright 1954 by Facts on File, Inc. Edw. Van Westerborg, Pres.-Treas.; Fred McGhee, Secy.-Editor; C. M. Schwartz, Business Manager.

AEC Split on Powers

The Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Com. indicated June 9 it had devised a compromise on a dispute within the Atomic Energy Comm. over the powers of the chairman, Rear Adm. Louis L. Strauss.

AEC members Henry D. Smyth, Thomas E. Murray & Eugene M. Zuckert—all appointed by ex-Pres. Truman—disclosed June 3 they were opposed to changing the 1946 Atomic Energy Act so as to give the chairman more power than other commissioners. They accused Strauss of having tried to set up "one-man rule" over the AEC. Murray & Smyth told the Joint Com. June 4 that Strauss had acted on some important matters without consulting them. Strauss urged the committee June 4 that the chairman be made sole administrator of policies set by the entire AEC. Joseph Campbell—like Strauss an Eisenhower appointee—indorsed Strauss' stand June 5.

The committee proposed June 9 that the Atomic Energy Act be revised so as to stipulate that all 5 AEC commissioners had "equal responsibility & authority" but the chairman controlled "execution" of policies.[1]

Parity, Housing Bills Gain

An Eisenhower-opposed bill to retain 90%-of-parity price supports for basic farm crops for one year was approved, 21-8, by the House Agriculture Com. June 8. Agri. Secy. Ezra Taft Benson, advocate of flexible 75%-to-90% supports after Dec. 31, implied that he would recommend a Presidential veto of the measure if it passed in Congress. The House committee's bill also would authorize the President to sell $1 billion worth of surplus commodities abroad for foreign currencies the next 3 years and use $300 million worth for foreign relief.[2]

The Senate voted by 66-16 June 3 to restore to the housing bill a 4-year program of 140,000 public housing units recommended by the President but cut out by the House. The measure went to joint conference.[3]

Democrats Demand Trade Action

Sen. Albert Gore (Tenn.), speaking for Senate Democrats, told the Senate June 8 that Democrats would try to force Congress to vote this year on the Eisenhower program to liberalize U.S. foreign trade. Gore said the President had surrendered "without a struggle" to Republicans opposed to more than a one-yr. extension of the reciprocal trade act.[4]

Unions Sign No-Raid Pact

Representatives of 65 AFL & 29 CIO unions signed ratification in Washington June 9 of an agreement to abstain for 2 years from enrolling members of opposite unions. An AFL-CIO statement said the "cease-fire" would be used to try to bring about an AFL-CIO merger. Unions signing the pact represented more than 10,000,000 members. Large unions refusing to sign: AFL Teamsters (1,300,000), CIO Steelworkers (1,200,000), AFL Carpenters (750,000).[5]

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McCARTHY-ARMY DISPUTE

Senators Clash In Hearings

Transcripts of monitored phone calls entered into the Senate hearing record this week resulted in Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy accusing Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) of instigating Army Secy. Robert T. Stevens' charges against McCarthy.[6]

Symington held that he had responded only to the Secretary's call in February for help against "abuse" of Army officers by McCarthy.

McCarthy's chief counsel, Roy M. Cohn, gave way to McCarthy as witness June 9. Joseph N. Welch, counsel for Stevens & Army counselor John G. Adams in the hearings, had dropped questioning of Cohn after McCarthy interrupted to denounce Frederick G. Fisher Jr., 32, of Welch's Boston law firm as a onetime member of the Natl. Lawyer's Guild.[7] Welch charged McCarthy with "cruelty & recklessness" in trying to "assassinate" Fisher's reputation.

* * *

Summary of Open Hearings

(Proceedings in Washington June 2-8 of Senate Permanent Subcom. on Investigations)

25th Day—June 2

McCarthy Says Reds in CIA

McCarthy charged during a discussion with committee members that "Communist infiltration of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]" and of atomic & hydrogen plants was "much more serious" & "more important" than the Monmouth situation. He said he had made a "preliminary investigation" and then had met with "2 of the members of the White House staff, the representatives of the Atty. General [&] one of our highest elected officials in the Executive Branch—and I'm not referring to Eisenhower. . . ." It was agreed at this meeting, he said, that "it would not be in the public interest to hold public hearings on the CIA, that that perhaps would be taken care of administratively."[8]

[CIA Dir. Allen W. Dulles retorted immediately by telling the press: "McCarthy's charge that the CIA is penetrated by Communists is false. Last summer a McCarthy report stated that an alleged Communist in the Govt. Printing Office had access to CIA classified material. That charge also was false. I wrote McCarthy on Oct. 22, 1953 to give me any information he might have on CIA personnel." McCarthy had not replied.][9]

Dispute on Defense Plant Risks

The subcommittee voted unanimously to ask McCarthy at an executive meeting next day to give to Defense Secy. Wilson the names of 130-135* alleged Communists or subversives who McCarthy had said repeatedly were working in defense plants.[10]

The vote culminated a dispute begun when Cohn testified that among the first things for the subcommittee to work on after the current hearings were (1) the calling of Loyalty Board members, (2) Communists in defense plants and (3) the Peress case. Cohn said that the alleged Communists were employed in 16 plants in Schenectady, Syracuse, Rome, Dunkirk & Buffalo, N.Y. and Quincy, Boston, Pittsfield, Lynn, Fitchburg, Cambridge & New Bedford, Mass.

Cohn & McCarthy called it unwise & useless to give names of defense plant suspects to the FBI or to Defense Secy. Wilson, as proposed by Sens. Jackson & Symington (both D.) & by Army counsel Welch. Cohn & McCarthy said that the FBI, Defense Dept. & defense plants already had the information. The FBI "told the appropriate agencies," Cohn said.

Cohn Charges 'Double-Talk'

Cohn noted that in the Peress case, "all we've gotten is double-talk & long delay . . . no results, no action." "The way to get results," he said, "is to hold our hearings . . . have them claim the 5th Amend., have the witnesses name them as Communists, have them fired. . . . I don't think Mr. Wilson . . . has the power to fire them from defense plants," where Wilson probably would claim no "jurisdiction to hire or fire. . . ."

"All we can do," McCarthy said, is "publicly expose [them] and hope they will be gotten rid of."

Symington, ex-Air Force Secy., said that in his experience, defense plants dismissed workers named by the FBI or other Govt. intelligence agencies as security risks. Cohn said union contracts, especially those with Communist-dominated unions, often prevented such ousters and that "the Knoll's Atomic Laboratory in upstate New York" was a case in point.

Symington's Motion Amended

Symington moved that the committee formally approve Welch's proposal that names of defense plant suspects be sent to Wilson "tonight." Dirksen said the resolution suspending the committee's normal activities probably would bar it from sending the names to the FBI or Wilson until the McCarthy-Army hearings ended. Mundt, agreeing to this, said that "we have no jurisdiction . . . over the files because these 130 names are not in the possession of our special investigating committee."

Symington moved that "regardless of any bureaucracy involved," Executive or Legislative, the committee should send Wilson the names immediately to protect U.S. security.

McCarthy asked Mundt to introduce a substitute motion authorizing his regular subcommittee to "hold public hearings on Communists in defense plants at any time this [special] committee is not sitting." He offered to let Defense Dept. security officers "sit down with our staff any time . . . and get all . . . they want."

Jackson observed that "this matter of the 135 Communists" had come up before the special committee and that

*Figure variously put at 130, 133, 135. 1—see p. 127F2 2—53A3 3—113C2 4—175D2 5—38F1 6—193A3 7—151E2 8—186A3, 171G3, 157F2, 138E1 9—Vol. XIII, 233D1 10—183F2

the committee should have power to act on matters before it.

Symington, on Mundt's advice, finally introduced the motion eventually adopted—that the matter be brought up again at an executive session of the regular subcommittee next day.

McCarthy said he did not need Symington's advice on exposing Communists, that Symington had retured to the committee after discussing with Stevens & Adams "the possibility of stalling our investigation of the Loyalty Board that was clearing Communists." Symington's reply: He "did not discuss blocking any Communist investigation"; Stevens & Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, came to him and said "that the way that Gen. Zwicker was being treated was very damaging to the morale of the Army"; he told them he was to leave for Europe in a day or 2 and would "do my best to block any further testimony of Army witnesses until I came back."[1]

Cohn Defends Informants

Symington asked Cohn whether "an officer or enlisted man who disseminated classified information outside of the Executive Branch in violation of security regulations necessary to the security & safety of the United States should be subjected to disciplinary action."

Cohn replied: "It depends on the circumstances . . . & to whom the material is disseminated." In the case of an FBI memo involved in the hearings [the so-called "2¼-page letter" produced by McCarthy], Cohn considered the dissemination justified since it gave McCarthy "information demonstrating . . . where the Executive had failed to take action despite a 3-yr. lapse of time. And I assume [the informant] did that in accordance with his oath to defend this nation against all enemies, foreign & domestic, and in accordance with his conscience. . . . He was calling it to the attention of the chairman of the Congressional committee which has the responsibility for exposing & correcting the failure of the Executive to act in situations such as that."[2]

McCarthy, however, said that "the Admin. is certainly heading in the right direction so far as getting rid of Communists is concerned."

Charges Discussed

Cohn agreed under Potter's questioning that the charges against him —abuse of committee power to get preferential treatment for Schine— were serious and that he should be ousted if they were true. But he told Dworshak that "it's a little peculiar . . . to have somebody [Adams & Stevens] . . . say you were abusing them & vituperating them . . . and in the next breath have them . . . invite you out to lunch & dinner and ask you to do things for him and continue a social relationship. . . ."[3] Cohn told Welch that "the collision between the Senator & the Army was not caused because of the Schine matter."

Cohn, under Welch's questioning, admitted that no plans had been made for Schine to finish his committee work although Schine was expected last July to get an Army commission.[4]

Cohn agreed with Potter that the conflicting testimony he, Stevens & Adams gave about Stevens' & Adams' alleged attempt to divert the inquiry to the Navy & Air Force indicated that perjury had been committed. But he called his own version truthful.[5]

McCarthy & Cohn opposed introduction of any monitored phone calls unless the Army agreed to admission of all such calls [an action presumably forbidden by Presidential directives against revealing security information or conversations among top Executive Branch officials].[6]

McCarthy again castigated Sen. Flanders, but Mundt rejected his request that Flanders be asked to testify about his attack on McCarthy.[7]

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26th Day—June 3

Dirksen Reads Monitored Calls

Dirksen read into the record transcripts of 3 monitored phone conversations between himself & Stevens. He did this after: (a) Cohn insisted that all monitored calls or none be introduced; (b) the subcommittee agreed that Dirksen could enter his calls since Stevens had given consent; (c) Mundt, McClellan & Potter said they too would introduce their calls.[8]

Substance of Dirksen's calls:

Feb. 20. [After Stevens offered to appear before the McCarthy Com. but directed Gen. Zwicker & 3 other officers to reject McCarthy's subpenas.] Stevens phoned. He said he had called McCarthy and told him that he had talked with subcommittee members about the Zwicker case. Stevens said McCarthy "got very mad" and eventually subpenaed him. Dirksen told Stevens that "those observations you gave me yesterday have all been stricken from the record." [This was presumed to mean that McCarthy's "abuse" of Zwicker, about which Stevens had complained, had been removed from the hearing transcript.] Stevens said that the subcommittee should hear the whole story from Zwicker. "I can't sit idly by and watch this officer corps crucified," Stevens said.

Feb. 25. [After the "fried chicken luncheon" at which Stevens agreed to supply the names in the Peress case, produce Zwicker for questioning and cancel a "showdown" hearing.] Stevens phoned and complained about the press reaction. "I am going to have to do something," he said. "It may get drastic. . . . I have been absolutely crucified & the services along with me." Stevens said that those at the luncheon should meet again and be told that "the whole thing is so misunderstood by the press that I will have to make a statement." He said he had told "Dick" [Vice Pres. Nixon], "Karl" [Mundt], "Charlie" [Potter] & "Jerry" [Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons, Deputy Asst. to the President]: "This thing is just incredible, and the press . . . is just absolutely going to say I am a yellow-belly and have quit & capitulated." Dirksen answered, "Let me call Karl," and hung up.

Feb. 25 [20 minutes later.] Dirksen phoned and invited Stevens to meet again with the group.[9]

Cohn, under McCarthy's questioning, said he never had seen the subcommittee mistreat a witness. He agreed with McCarthy that in "the shining example of mistreatment," the Zwicker case: (a) McCarthy gave Zwicker's doctor "the absolute right to call a halt to the questioning" if he felt it might affect Zwicker's heart; (b) McCarthy ordered Zwicker to listen to McCarthy's press conference and "to correct any misstatements that I [McCarthy] made"; (c) nothing was deleted from the transcript of the Zwicker hearing; (d) Zwicker was not abused.[10]

Cohn also agreed with McCarthy's statement—in answer to charges that he ran a "one-man investigating committee"—that "in almost every instance" Republican members sent representatives to hearings or asked for a daily resumé of proceedings.

Names Offered to Seaton

McCarthy announced that, as directed by committee vote[11], he had asked Asst. Defense Secy. Seaton to send for the list of 133 Communists in defense plants. But McCarthy had insisted that no names be made public until the person involved had a chance to appear before the subcommittee or a loyalty board. McCarthy said Seaton had replied that he wanted the list but was troubled by the restriction.

Sens. McClellan & Jackson criticized the Defense Dept. for delaying.

Shortly thereafter McCarthy said Seaton had just phoned and asked for the names but had said that the rule against making them public "might tie the hands of the Defense Dept." in investigating & exposing suspects.

McCarthy said he had told Seaton: "Even though their records indicate that they all have been active in Communist work . . . the law of averages would indicate that certainly a few . . . might be able to prove their innocence. . . ." He said they would try to work out a basis for giving the Defense Dept. the names.

[Seaton formally requested the names in a letter delivered to McCarthy late June 3. In the letter, Seaton said that "the department must be free to act without consulting you." Seaton revealed that he had tried in vain to contact McCarthy to get the names the previous evening.]

Symington read a Defense Dept. memo to the effect that the services could not force an employer to dismiss anybody but could & did (a) require security clearance for classified work and (b) order suspects removed from such work.

Cohn said, however, that sometimes the services give clearance rights to private contractors. He added that a Communist doing unclassified work in a defense plant could get secrets or do sabotage.

[McCarthy called an executive session for the evening of June 3 to attempt to get a vote permitting him to hold evening & Saturday hearings on subversives in defense plants. The meeting was canceled by refusal of the Democrats to attend.]

Mundt on Hiss Case

Mundt said that since the Hiss case had been mentioned often in the current hearings and since he had been acting chairman of the House Un-American Activities Com. during the case, "it might be appropriate to have the true facts of that connection in the record." Mundt continued:

". . . A young [State Dept.] security officer . . . came to my office after midnight . . . and brought me some material from the security files of the State Dept. in violation of a Presidential directive—a directive issued by Pres. Truman . . . as we were working on the Hiss case that stopped us from having access to certain files which we

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1—see p. 186D1, E2 2—p. 186A-D2 3—p. 185C3 4—p. 186A3 5—p. 185F1-D2 6—p. 174D3 7—p. 187B-D3 8—p. 194B2, F2 9—165D-E2, 61G2-F3 10—186D-E1 11—191G2

had previously been able to explore. [He] brought some information which enabled us to go on with the case with the realization & assurance that we had information available if we could prove it. We could not use the material he brought because he took it back to the files, but he gave us the assurance at a critical juncture that there was . . . 'gold in them thar hills.' . . . This information had been made available through the FBI by Whittaker Chambers. The FBI . . . quickly . . . transmitted that information to the Secy. of State, but nothing was done about Alger Hiss at that juncture. Whittaker Chambers later communicated that information to Mr. Adolf Berle, [then in] the State Dept. . . . Berle took the information to the White House and gave it directly to Pres. Roosevelt.[1] . . . After that . . . the information was made available to the House committee. . . . Alger Hiss [is] in the federal penitentiary now solely because things were done in violation of an Executive Order. . . ."[2]

Cohn on Monmouth Spying

Cohn, under Potter's questioning, labeled as "inaccurate" (he refused to use the word "false") Stevens' statement that he (Stevens) had stuck to his denial that the Army had evidence of "current espionage" at Monmouth. According to Cohn, Stevens "took back this 'no espionage' statement and said that there had been espionage . . . he knew that as a fact, that it had, I believe . . . continued after the war." Cohn himself said: "I can't state . . . whether espionage is today or was then going on at Ft. Monmouth."[3]

Cohn agreed with Mundt that he (Cohn), Adams, McCarthy & Stevens had cooperated during the early stages of the Monmouth probe.[4]

Cohn charged that there was a "stacked deck" against his side because Atty. Gen. Brownell & Deputy Atty. Gen. Rogers were "instigators" of the hearings yet would pass on perjury charges resulting from them.[5]

Cohn, under Welch's questioning, said that Loyalty Board members had no immunity from subpenas of Congressional committees. He said he had a right to question them about their conduct as Loyalty Board members, about charges that they "cleared Communists," about all evidence, reasons for their decisions & cases still before them.[6]

Hensel Plea Rejected

Mundt disclosed that Asst. Defense Secy. Hensel had requested that the hearings show that McCarthy's charges against him were baseless. This was rejected after McClellan opposed it on grounds that Hensel's counsel had agreed to Hensel's dismissal as a principal. McCarthy suggested that Symington investigate the matter as a one-man subcommittee. Symington refused.[7]

During a break, Mundt was presented with a birthday cake in celebration of his 54th birthday.

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27th Day—June 4

More Phone Calls Entered

Stevens' monitored phone talks with Sens. Mundt, Symington & Potter were read into the record by Army employes who had monitored them: Mrs. Jane R. Pike, Stevens' secretary; John J. Lucas Jr., Stevens' appointments clerk, & Theodore R. Rhodes Jr., departmental shorthand reporter.

Before the reading, Mundt urged Welch to try to get calls between Stevens & Adams & other Executive officials exempted from the Presidential secrecy directive. Welch promised to "nudge" the Army.

Mrs. Pike read her summary of a Feb. 20 phone call in which Stevens told Mundt that McCarthy "blew his lid" when Stevens said he intended to keep Gen. Zwicker from testifying again.

Rhodes read a Feb. 21 call in which Stevens said to Mundt that McCarthy "told me on the phone yesterday that I could consider myself subpenaed."

Lucas testified to a Feb. 24 phone conversation in which Stevens discussed with Mundt the memo of understanding agreed to at the "fried chicken luncheon" that day. Stevens said they had done "what we set out to do and that was to get our fellows treated right by that committee." Mundt told Stevens to "treat [Schine] like he was anybody's boy now; don't pay any attention to us. . . ."

Symington Offer on Calls

Before Symington authorized introduction of his calls, he announced that they had resulted from a Stevens-McCarthy conversation and "might be misconstrued unless they were put into the record along with calls . . . to Mr. Stevens by Sen. McCarthy & the staff." He told McCarthy he would enter the calls "the minute you put your calls in. . . ."

McCarthy immediately asked for "both our calls." Symington added that he would "put my calls in at the time that you, Mr. Cohn & Mr. Carr put your calls in." McCarthy protested that Symington was "qualifying" his offer. Symington said he understood that McCarthy had been "speaking for your side."

Symington expressed surprise at "such a great interest" by McCarthy "& the Republican members of this committee to get the telephone calls of the committee members as against the telephone calls of the principals." "We're not defendants . . . we're judges," Symington said.

McCarthy said Symington "was not on the committee when he had the first conversations with Stevens, Adams," but returned to it "within . . . 6 days, I believe," of these talks. He advised Symington to "take the oath . . . and tell us what occured . . . whether you were asked to come back."

Symington denied "any telephone calls with Mr. Stevens until . . . after I came back on this committee."

Symington pressed for McCarthy, Cohn & Carr to sign an authorization to enter their phone calls.* As he did so, Mundt said repeatedly that McClellan had the floor. Symington said to Mundt, "Don't try to get anybody off the hook." McCarthy repeated his stand that "I will not allow anyone to select certain calls, that if we put in these calls that all . . . must be put in."

The issue was resolved temporarily when Welch announced that he & McCarthy had agreed that: The Presidential directive "makes it no longer possible that every telephone call between every person can be introduced." This impasse was "not the creation of anybody at this table alone." The "only solution" would be that "any & all Senators," including McCarthy, could offer their calls for the record. When they are all in, "we then [will] quit hassling about telephone calls. . . ."

Symington's Calls Introduced

Rhodes read his transcripts of 3 Feb. 20 phone conversations between Symington & Stevens:

(1) In the first call, by Stevens to Symington, Stevens gave this account of a call he made to McCarthy: Stevens told McCarthy "that I had called on all the members of the committee I could find yesterday and . . . said that I did not intend to produce Zwicker and . . . did not intend to have this abuse of our professional officer corps continued. . . . [McCarthy] started to beat my brains out. . . . I am a coddler of of Reds, you see. . . . [McCarthy] blew his lid" and asked whether Stevens would accept a subpena. Stevens said he would "take that under advisement." McCarthy said, "You are subpenaed. . . ."

Symington advised Stevens to keep the record of the call. He said McCarthy's "man" had phoned and promised to postpone a new Zwicker hearing until he (Symington) returned from Europe, if he wanted. Stevens said he guessed McCarthy was "calling another meeting now for the purpose of beating my brains out." Symington advised him not to "go until I am here" and promised to "get into that with [Clark M.] Clifford. . . . I just wouldn't go. Let me talk to Clifford . . . and I will call you."

(2) Symington called Stevens later that morning and said, ". . . Our legal friend . . . . thinks it was a mistake for you to call Mac [McCarthy]." Symington was writing McCarthy to ask him to postpone "any hearing with respect to Secy. Stevens or the Army." Symington advised Stevens: "Let's counter-punch . . . not lead. . . . This boy gets awfully rough. I would use those telephone numbers I gave you yesterday. He has a deep . . . dislike for your opponent."

Stevens replied: It might be "poor politics & poor judgment to call" McCarthy but, "having gone & called on members of the committee, it was the right thing to do and it would not give him a chance to say that we go around behind his back."

Symington said: "It isn't a question of politics [but] of the integrity & fighting morale of the Army. . . . Everybody . . . who has a concept of what is decent will break their back to help you. . . . I would never get near him if I could help it."

(3) Symington phoned Stevens that afternoon and reported: "My friend yesterday said, 'This guy got any steel in him?' I said, 'Sure.' . . . He said, 'If he had steel he can do a great service.' . . . I think you are in shape to protect your Army provided you don't miss one and . . . stay tough. . . . One other fellow . . . on your side . . . is [Deputy Atty. Gen.] Bill Rogers. . . . This fellow [McCarthy] might be sick. . . . We don't want to push him in a place where he had to do it [subpena Stevens] to preserve face, because on that basis he will do anything. . . ."

Rhodes read his record of a Feb. 21 call from Symington to Stevens:

Symington told Stevens of a Washington Post report that Stevens would "volunteer to appear."

Stevens: "They must have dreamed that up. . . . I can't create the impression . . . that I am scared of this guy," but "I haven't made any statement."

Symington: "If you & I are going to work together we have got to be on the table with each other. . . . If you are going to play with McCarthy, you have got to forget about me or those Marquess of Queensbury rules. . . . Here is the way they operate. If they felt that he had gone too far . . . they would lead you to leak it to a reporter that maybe you had asked to come instead of the fact that they had instructed you to come. . . . Don't put me in a box by going up there Tuesday. . . . We can throw the blocks in this thing. . . . I just ask you not to make me look silly. If you decide to go up before I get back, that is 100% with me. . . ."

Stevens: "I am not going to put you in any box."

Lucas read his notes on a Mar. 8 call from Symington to Stevens:

Symington said that "somebody has been leaking about" the report on Schine and that he wanted to see it "if the Army is willing to release it." Stevens doubted that it was ready for release.

Stevens: "I don't know where it is, what shape it is in or if it is available. . . . I don't have anything at all myself. . . . I personally think that anything in that line would prove to be much exaggerated. . . . By & large as far as the

1—see Vol. VIII, p. 252E 2—pp. 186B2, 173C2
3—p. 187B2 4—p. 187F1 5—pp. 162E2, 163D3
6—p. 184E3 7—p. 174A2-B3

treatment of me is concerned, I have no personal complaint. . . . When he got after Zwicker, of course, then I hollered, but . . . I don't have a lot of stuff as far as my contact with Joe or the committee is concerned."

Symington: ". . . You & John told me some of the things that have been said by the fellows that are still active. I am not looking for trouble but apparently I can't run from it. . . . I would appreciate this being private between you & me. I have heard that the Army now is pulling back a bit on the report because it is not good for the Army. . . ."

Stevens: ". . . I don't feel I have any particular knowledge of it, and I don't think there is too much of it. I think it has been a lot of talk. . . . However, I can talk to Adams and find out. . . ."

Symington said that a reason for his interest was his responsibility for the committee staff.

McCarthy for Disqualification

McCarthy demanded that Symington disqualify himself from the committee and "take the stand" as a witness because, he said, the phone calls showed that:

(a) Symington arranged for Clark Clifford, ex-Pres. Truman's "top aide," to advise Stevens; (b) Symington made "a working arrangement" with Stevens and told him "to keep this quiet"; (c) Symington "came back on this committee to try & wreck our attempts to expose Communists who had infiltrated this Administration."

McCarthy said that, according to the calls, Deputy Atty. Gen. Rogers, who would pass on evidence, contempt & perjury in the hearings, was on Stevens' & Symington's "side."

Symington called this "just another diversion." He refused to disqualify himself and challenged McCarthy to take the dispute to the Senate. Symington said: Stevens & Rogers "came to me" for "help." Stevens "felt that the way [McCarthy] had handled Gen. Zwicker had seriously impaired, crippled the morale" of the Army. Symington advised Stevens to "get a good lawyer" and recommended Clifford after Stevens "asked me if I knew a good lawyer." All Symington's conversations with Stevens were before it was decided to hold hearings. "I have not discussed anything with any principal" after the decision on hearings.

Cohn then asked Symington to step off the committee on grounds that "before the hearings began, [Symington] said to one of the principals who had made the charges against us that they are going to work with him together." Symington answered that he & Stevens had been trying to make sure that he would be back from Europe before there were any more Army hearings.

Mundt observed that Symington's calls "cast a new light on the whole controversy."

Cohn's Calls Demanded

Symington moved that Cohn & Carr be asked to consent to introduction of their phone calls. He said that they claimed to have made them on committee business and this gave the committee some rights. Symington suggested that the committee should consider firing them if they refused.

Jackson accused Cohn of pretending willingness to introduce his calls but attaching an impossible condition—a demand that they go in only with calls which Presidential directive prohibited from being entered. Cohn, against McCarthy's advice, said he would permit his own calls to be introduced unconditionally. He said he was trying to reach Carr for consent to introduce Carr's calls. He announced that Schine had authorized entry of an Oct. 21 call "which Mr. Stevens made to him—although Mr. Stevens denied making it. . . ."

Potter's Calls Read

Potter had 2 calls between himself & Stevens read into the record. In the first, Stevens told him of telling McCarthy he refused to allow Zwicker to appear before him again. In the 2d, Stevens thanked Potter for helping him in his dispute with McCarthy. "In an attempt to cooperate . . . I was crucified," Stevens said.

Cohn Lauds Crouch

Jackson questioned Cohn about subcommittee informant Paul Crouch. Cohn said Crouch "probably had more to do . . . with the plans of the Communist conspiracy to infiltrate the armed forces than anyone else."[1]

Jackson asked what current information Crouch could have & how he got it in view of his having left the party in 1942.

Cohn said: "After [Crouch] left the party he continued a close study of Communist literature. . . . He was in contact with other people who had detailed knowledge of the Communist movement. . . . Once . . . you learn the code . . . of the Communist publications & . . . writings . . . & tactics . . . you are in a very good position to know what is going on in the Communist Party, what their line is, what their tactics are. . . . He could interpret the Communist line [on] infiltration of the armed forces."

Cohn agreed that the FBI & other Govt. intelligence agencies might keep "more current" than Crouch. But he said they were prohibited from giving the committee information.

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28th Day—June 7

26 Phone Talks Put on Record

Most of the day was taken up with reading of 26 monitored phone calls—3 McClellan-Stevens, 3 McCarthy-Stevens, one Schine-Stevens, 9 Cohn-Stevens & 10 Carr-Adams calls.

Substance of McClellan's calls:

Feb. 20. Stevens said: He told McCarthy he would not let Zwicker appear; McCarthy "hopped" on Stevens "pretty hard" and asked if he would accept a subpena; Stevens took it under advisement.[2] McClellan advised Stevens to "announce to the press that [he] was going to request the opportunity to appear." Stevens: "I think that is a good suggestion." McClellan: "Beat him to the punch. . . ."

Feb. 21. Stevens phoned and said he was "willing to be heard [but did not want] to muddy the waters like volunteering to appear when you gentlemen might have an idea of having this hearing deferred. . . . I would much rather have it deferred until Stu [Symington] gets back. . . ."[3]

Mar. 1. McClellan called & expressed surprise that Stevens "got off over there in that gang [at the "chicken luncheon"] without anybody with you. . . . We were left out of it. I just had to take the position it was a Republican quarrel."[4]

McCarthy Submits Calls

McCarthy's 3 phone talks with Stevens went into the record next. [McCarthy had given copies of the transcripts to the AP, UP & INS June 5 with the stipulation that he not be named as the source.]

Substance of the calls:

Nov. 7, 1953. McCarthy phoned & said: ". . . For God's sake, don't . . . assign [Schine] back to my committee. . . . The newspapers would be back on us. . . . [The left-wingers] don't like this cooperation between the committee & the Army. . . . They would say I asked for him. He is a good boy, but there is nothing indispensible about him. . . . It would be embarrassing if held to me.[5] If he could get off week-ends—Roy—it is one of the few things I have seem him completely unreasonable about. He thinks Dave [Schine] should be a general and work from the penthouse of the Waldorf."[6] [McCarthy told the wire services that the dashes before & after "Roy" indicated omissions by the stenographer. Omitted, he said, was his story of a dispute in which Cohn told McCarthy he needed Schine more than week-ends for reports on the information program inquiry.][7]

Stevens: "That is where my problem has come from. . . . You never have done or said anything . . . other than to take a friendly interest."

McCarthy: ". . . I think for Roy's sake if you can let [Schine] come back for week-ends or something so his girls won't get too lonesome—maybe if they shave his hair off he won't want to come back." . . .[8]

Jan. 14. McCarthy returned Stevens' call. Stevens was going to the Far East and asked for an appointment. They arranged to meet that evening.

Feb. 20. Stevens phoned & said: ". . . I went over yesterday on the Hill and called on [any] members of your subcommittee . . . that happened to be over there . . . Sens. Dirksen, Potter, Mundt, McClellan & Symington, because I was so upset by the reports . . . on the executive appearance of Gen. Zwicker. . . ."

McCarthy: ". . . You have got a wonderful opportunity . . . to either set the course for a house-cleaning, take the position that the Congress knows about traitors no matter where they are, [or] to try to cover up. . . . I have had a most insulting session with the general. I have got a letter which I am sure you didn't write—"

Stevens: "I was completely in on that letter. . . . I took it home & worked on it one evening."

McCarthy: ". . . [Your advice] that the commissioning of Communists was an order against discrimination because of political beliefs . . . is jargon. . . . Are [you] going to try to keep from us the names of the officers who protected these men?"

Stevens: "I am going to try to prevent my officers from going before your committee until you & I have an understanding as to [their] abuse . . ."

McCarthy: "You will not protect them from going before our committee. . . . Go ahead & try. . . . I am going to kick the brains out of anyone who protects Communists. If that is the policy of you, just go ahead & do it. I will guarantee you that you will live to regret it. . . . If this new Admin. of the Army is going to try to protect the hangovers from the old, that, in turn, protected Communists, the people will know about it. . . . Instead of protecting Communists, you should be helping us uncover them. I don't give a damn whether an officer is a general . . . when he comes before us with the ignorant, stupid, insulting aspect of those who appeared, I will guarantee you that the American people will know all about it."

Stevens: ". . . You know . . . I have no intention of covering up any Communists. . . ."

McCarthy: "That is exactly what the Army is doing [by refusing to] tell us who is protecting the Communist major. . . . Would you consider yourself subpenaed for 10 o'clock Tuesday morning?"

Stevens: "I will take that under advisement."

McCarthy: ". . . I am telling the press that you have been told to appear. If you decide not to, we will take steps from there on. I am all through with this covering up of Communists. I am sorry that Bob Stevens is one that is doing it too."[9]

Stevens Phoned Schine

Jenkins read the transcript of an Oct. 21 call from Stevens in Washington to Schine in New York:

Stevens said: He was "sorry I missed you yes-

1—see p. 183D-E2 2—see F3 this page 3—see p. 193B3 4—192F2 5—187A1 6—138F3 7—186C3 8—138F3 9—F2 this page

terday" and "would rather have talked with you in person than to have called you on the phone." He & Defense Secy. Wilson had "reviewed this whole situation" and saw no "appropriate way to avoid the basic training. . . . I think there is an excellent chance that we can pick you up [after training] and use you in a way that would be useful to the country & to yourself. . . . I personally would like to arrange it . . . that you could use the knowledge & ability you have in certain fields. . . ." Stevens was going to California but if Schine "would like to get hold of me" he could do so. "I will be delighted to hear from you at any time."[1]

[The Chicago Tribune published a transcript of the above call June 6.]

Lucas, who monitored the call, said his shorthand report was prefixed by the notation: "Secy. Stevens returned call of David Schine." Army Counsel St. Clair cited phone company records to show that Schine had called Stevens Oct. 19. Cohn then read Stevens' testimony that "Dave Schine called me up on the 21st of October."

Schine took the stand & testified: ". . . Stevens did most of the talking. . . . On the 19th arrangements were being made for a trip to Ft. Monmouth. . . . On the 21st Secy. Stevens called me [and said] he was sorry that he did not have the opportunity to see me at Ft. Monmouth. . . . Therefore he had to call me. [It] was an entirely different matter. . . ."

Cohn-Stevens Calls

Jenkins read a series of 10 Cohn-Stevens phone conversations:

Sept. 23. Cohn phoned and told Stevens it was "up to you" whether the committee questioned Gen. Partridge, ex-chief of Army Intelligence (G-2).[2] Stevens said Cohn "wouldn't be gaining much . . . to make the G-2 look awful silly." He told Cohn to "handle it as you think best but don't let's have too much of a spectacle."

Cohn: "I'm afraid once he gets up there there will not be too much of way to stop the thing. . . . You might want a nice gentle fight, but once you get in the ring and start taking a couple of pokes it gets under your skin. . . . I think it would be a lot of fun. . . . I'm an old big-game hunter, but . . . I can see why that would not be a good idea from the standpoint of over there. . . ."

Sept. 25. Cohn returned Stevens' call and said, "We had your friend* call us." Stevens replied that "he said he stayed away from the 5th Amend."

Cohn: "We're getting a contempt citation against him. . . . There is a new [Army] situation [that] looks pretty bad. . . . They are trying to cover up so you won't even know about it."

Stevens: ". . . I want to uncover . . . everything. . . . I think Partridge ought to come up there. . . . If you reach him . . . go ahead with him and if not, I will play with it any way you want."

Cohn: ". . . I don't know whether it is going to make us look too bad, look foolish. You expect to see a great brain the head of something like that and . . . I don't know if there is something there. . . . If we don't call him, that is . . . in the common good. It is not a matter of life & death to us. . . ."

Stevens: ". . . He will come in on 5 minutes' notice any time you want him in. . . ."

Sept. 28. Cohn called & asked, "Who's playing tricks on us?" Stevens said, "I don't know whether anybody [sent] for him to come." Cohn: "It was our understanding that he would not come. . . ."

Stevens: "But when Joe [McCarthy] made that speech— . . ."

Cohn: "When we have an arrangement I will stick by it no matter what Joe says . . . and our understanding was that he would not be called. Now the guy walks right in . . . surrounded by . . . newsmen."

Stevens: "I [was] under the impression from what Joe said . . . that he probably brought him. . . ."

Cohn: "I persuaded them here not to call him. I think it would be catastrophic to call [him]."

Stevens: "Shall I yank him out of there?"

Cohn: "No. We will work out something. I had to poll the Senators and they had all agreed we would not call him. . . ."

Stevens: "I'm awfully sorry about this"; "the way you have played with me has been 100%. . . ."

Sept. 28. Cohn returned Stevens' call. Stevens said, "You were completely correct and I muffed the ball." [They conversed about Sen. Potter's investigation of Korean war atrocities.]

Sept. 30. Cohn phoned Stevens from New York and said he "will probably be ready to tell you . . . in a day or so" about the situation Cohn had broached Sept. 25. They agreed to meet Friday (Oct. 2).

Oct. 1. Cohn phoned from New York about arrangements for the Oct. 2 meeting.

Oct. 27. Stevens in Washington returned Cohn's call from New York. Cohn said he had spoken to Adams about "a problem on this Gen. Reichelberger [presumably Reichelderfer], who made the decision not to kick out [Aaron] Coleman [at Ft. Monmouth] in '46 when they found the documents in his home."[3]

Cohn: ". . . I gave John [Adams] a couple of names. . . . One fellow I think was definitely in espionage recently. We've got the question of this screening board which reversed all these suspensions. [McCarthy apparently intended] to insist on calling in some of the [board] members. . . . That will get into a question of directives & Executive Orders. . . . If you would want to start exploring that situation . . . that will be held up. . . . The main thing I am concerned about [regarding Schine], since nothing else can apparently be done, since we are in the middle of this thing here, we would like him around for a while. [Brig. Gen. Louis Huber Renfrow, deputy Selective Service director] said he could be furloughed for a couple of weeks. And I'm thinking of this CIA thing. . . ."[4]

Stevens: ". . . I haven't given it any particular thought because it was more or less on ice until you or Dave brought it up again."

Cohn: "For a while anyway it might be a good idea, because with us going into the shop over there with such intensity it might avoid embarrassment. . . . Could the people over there pick him up right away? . . . How . . . should we go at that?"

Stevens: "Do you want me to talk with [CIA Dir.] Allen Dulles? I think I might do it."

Cohn: "I would appreciate that. . . . Our main problem is this loyalty board. Joe is going to make a statement in Milwaukee on that, using the usual . . . adjectives. He has 5 cases . . . in which they reversed suspensions of pretty bad people. . . ."

Oct. 28. Cohn returned Stevens' call. Stevens said Dulles had told him that the CIA took nobody "eligible for the draft" and wanted those taken "to spend an extended number of years in the business. . . ." "On the furlough business," Stevens said, "It is an unusual procedure but I am accustomed to trying to do very unusual things. . . . If Dave were inducted next week . . . I would issue orders" assigning "him to [temporary] duty at First Army so he could continue with you" for a couple of weeks.

Cohn: ". . . We appreciate [this]. It is the only major headache we have. . . ."

Nov. 2. Cohn phoned and asked "if there was anything we were supposed to do on Dave's case."

Stevens: "Not a thing. [I] had arrangements made so he would be detached for duty with the First Army. . . . If it looks as if the thing isn't working as it should, I should be notified at once. . . ."

Carr-Adams Conversations

Prior to reading of 10 Carr-Adams calls, McCarthy noted that no Carr-Adams calls were monitored until "the day after the luncheon at which . . . Stevens blew up a bit." McCarthy predicted "that you may find a great deal of self-serving material" in the calls. He said Carr did not know his calls were being "eavesdropped."

Substance of the calls:

Feb. 25. Adams & Carr discussed "the ruckus." Adams said, "The situation deteriorated since those friendly days." Carr felt it was only "a little bit out of hand." Adams said, "I have reason to believe that artillery is being directed at me." He pressed Carr to agree that he never had discounted the FBI although he might have told Cohn in exasperation: "What is an FBI report? It is only a report."

Mar. 2. Adams said at the outset that he was using a "recorder" on the call. Carr said that Symington & Dirksen had "requested that the thing be held off so that they can appear."

Mar. 3 & 4. Unrelated cases were discussed.

Mar. 5. Adams said he had good reports on Schine: Schine "is behaving in circumspect manner . . . is damn good soldier. . . . They are considering him for leadership course" but "for God's sake don't tell . . . Roy. . . . I don't want him to think he has a commitment to leadership school. . . . Remember trouble we got in because I spoke before I knew the number of weeks he would have to stay in Gordon. And Roy almost blew the roof off. . . ." Schine "got rid of Cadillac . . . and got a 2d-hand Chevvie. . . . I am very pleased Dave is behaving at Gordon the way I was trying to persuade you & Roy he should behave at Dix. . . . As I tried to tell Roy 68 times, if he would let the guy be in the Army, things would work out . . . better than if he kept haunting us." . . .

Mar. 8. The day's business was postponed.

Mar. 9. At the outset Carr asked Adams to "let me get my machine on." They discussed an unrelated case, then Carr asked: ". . . I take it you are not interested in getting together with me?" Adams: "That is not so. . . ." Carr: ". . . I thought I was working with you." Adams: "I will be up to see you." Carr: "I . . . got involved in a commitment." Adams: "I am interested, Frank." Carr: "This is my last offer, friend." . . .[5]

2 other Carr-Adams calls about an unrelated case were read.

Eleanor Glancy, Adams' secretary, testified under Cohn's questioning that she monitored Adams-Carr calls only after Feb. 25 and that it had not been regular practice for Adams to have calls monitored.

Mrs. Frances Perry Mims, Cohn's & Carr's secretary, testified that it was not usual for her office to monitor calls but that she monitored part of a Jan. 9 call from Adams. In it, Adams told Carr that the Army Loyalty Appeal Board had been superseded under Executive Order by a Loyalty Review Board with different personnel but that the subcommittee could not take credit.

McCarthy-Symington Clash

McCarthy demanded that Clark Clifford & Symington be called to testify as presumptive instigators of the charges against the McCarthy side. He denounced Symington as urging unfair fighting by telling Stevens to forget "Marquess of Queensbury rules" in dealing with McCarthy.[6]

McCarthy interpreted Symington's remark about throwing "the blocks in this thing" as a plot to stop investigation of Communists. He noted that Stevens had "said [to Symington] only 24 hours . . . before the [Schine] charges were issued that there was really nothing in the charges."

McCarthy said Symington "should do exactly as I did," at Symington's insistance—"he should disqualify himself because never before in the history of this Senate . . . have we had a man who instituted the charges insist upon sitting as judge."[7]

Symington's Rebuttal

Symington said that his remark about Queensbury rules was to warn Stevens to "look out because if he got in a scrap he might find that [McCarthy] would not use rules which were decent or right or fair."

"My chief interest," Symington said, "was not to have the military establishment . . . hammered any more while I was gone." This, he said, was why he advised Stevens. As for Mc-

*Not identified in transcript. 1—see p. 187A1 2—see 148A2 3—see 148G1 4—see 138G2 5—159G3 6—193F3 7—92G1

Carthy's demand that he be subpenaed, Symington offered "to discuss this . . . on the Senate floor."

"How about under oath?" McCarthy demanded. Symington retorted: "I will be very glad to take the oath, something you've never done [about charges involving McCarthy's personal finances][1] . . . if the Senate decides that I should."

Symington reviewed his actions in the case, which he said started when Stevens & Gen. Ridgway came to him and complained that Army morale was being "seriously impaired by the actions of Sen. McCarthy." He said his acts were directed only to getting fair hearings. His phone conversations with Stevens "had nothing to do . . . with the subject matter of these proceedings," Symington said.

Symington continued: "I was in Europe . . . when press reports [said] that following the now famous chicken luncheon, Sen. McCarthy was purported to have said that the Secretary . . . could not have given in more to him if he had crawled to him on his belly. And I shall never forget . . . the consternation [of our Army & AF officers at] this news. . . ."[2]

'Terrible Charges' Aired

Symington gave a list of "terrible charges" made public in the hearings:

(a) "Our people have been urged to entertain serious doubts as to the dedication & loyalty of our armed forces from top to bottom"; (b) "we've heard testimony that some of our military leaders are coddling Communists & traitors"; (c) "we've heard it said under oath that the power of a [Senate] committee . . . has been perverted to obtain preferential treatment for a young man"; (d) McCarthy said "that the Eisenhower Admin., this Republican Admin., has added a year of treason to our history"; (e) Atty. Gen. Brownell "had been compared with another Atty. General, Harry Dougherty, who was indicted for one of the most scandalous thefts in our history"; (f) the CIA, "our worldwide intelligence agency & fundamental to our security, has been charged by Sen. McCarthy with being infiltrated with Communists"; (g) "it's also been charged here that there are Communists in our atomic [& hydrogen] bomb plants"; (h) "it's been testified that there are 135 Communists in our defense plants, but the witness [Cohn] who gave this testimony said there'd be no point in turning over their names to [Defense Secy. Wilson] because he wouldn't do anything about getting rid of them."

McCarthy retorted that Symington "has been conniving secretly to get the top political adviser of the Democrats to try to get the Republicans to commit suicide," that "he got Clark Clifford to mislead a fine, naïve, not-too-brilliant Republican" Army Secy.

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29th Day—June 8

Cohn Affirms Charges

Cohn, under McClellan's questioning, affirmed charges that:

(a) Adams "used every effort to discover the names of persons reporting . . . Communist infiltration to the subcommittee, stating that if he discovered any in his department 'he would have their heads' "; (b) Adams told Cohn & Carr in December & January he "would stop at nothing to prevent the subcommittee from going into this"; (c) Stevens & Adams put "every conceivable obstacle . . . in the path of the subcommittee's search for the truth."

McClellan asked whether Cohn would have exposed Stevens & Adams as coddlers of Communists if Stevens & Adams had not issued their charges against McCarthy & his aides. Cohn indicated that some such exposure might have been expected eventually but that the subcommittee's other investigations took precedence. Cohn said of Stevens: he felt that "people" were trying to mislead the Secretary to withhold information that would permit the subcommittee to "uncover people who have been coddling these Communists. . . ."

Cohn, under Welch's questioning, denied that the alleged Stevens-Adams offer of "leads" for the committee to "go after" the Navy, AF & Defense Dept. was a proposal "to rat on" or "betray" the other services.

Cohn said he still considered Stevens a fine, courteous gentleman whose viewpoint was that other services had "the same situation."

McCarthy, announcing that he found himself "more or less in the role of defense attorney for Mr. Stevens," asked Cohn to agree that Stevens & Adams did not offer to "rat" on the other services but only "to give information . . . which any loyal American" should give. Cohn agreed.[3]

Cohn on Peress' Importance

Welch asked Cohn about the importance the McCarthy side attached to the Peress case in view of the fact that Maj. Peress, a dentist, "had no unusual clearances [for] high-secret stuff" and was not at Monmouth. Cohn agreed that one danger was that a Communist might indoctrinate others. He added: ". . . We think that the mechanism of how it is possible for a man to get a commission in the Army and then get a promotion despite an open Communist record & despite the fact he claimed the 5th Amend. must lead this committee to inquire who in the Army, knowing [this], would promote him to the rank of major."[4]

Symington-McCarthy Dispute

The dispute between McCarthy & Symington erupted again when McCarthy called once more for Symington to testify. Symington offered this "arrangement": that both he & McCarthy address the Senate, that then Symington "come before this committee & testify" provided McCarthy "come before this committee & testify . . . with respect to the charges . . . unanimously signed by Democrats & Republicans."[1]

McCarthy said Symington was talking about "the old Benton charges." He asked Symington to agree just "that we both come before the committee." Symington said he was not talking about the Benton charges but about the "Lustron loan." He told McCarthy that this was "your committee" and that the Senate should "arrange a committee to hear you & a committee to hear me. . . ."

McCarthy & Symington accused each other of avoiding testifying. Symington, resenting McCarthy's calling him "Sanctimonious Stu," advised McCarthy to "go to a psychiatrist."[5]

Cohn Pressed on Secret Data

Welch asked Cohn about McCarthy's call to Govt. employes to bring him information. Cohn said he was "not concerned about the actual bringing of a document" but about "learning of situations in which . . . information about Communists is being ignored by a Govt. agency which is letting those Communists stay on the job." Cohn refused to tell whether he thought Govt. employes should give McCarthy classified data, but he said he considered it "all right" for McCarthy to take the purported FBI letter.[6]

Quizzed on Coleman, Schine

Cohn, questioned by St. Clair, admitted that Aaron Coleman had not had security clearance since Jan. 1952, but he said he did not know that the building where Coleman worked was off the Monmouth post.[7] He said he thought somebody superior to Gen. Lawton had issued a "blackout order" forbidding Monmouth personnel to give information to McCarthy aides.[8]

McClellan asked if Cohn had "any special interest" in Schine "that would bind you to him closer than to the ordinary friend." Cohn said "no," Schine was just a good friend.[9]

Clifford Call Pledged

During an executive session which preceeded the June 8 hearing, the subcommittee rejected Jackson's proposal to grant McCarthy's request to call Clark Clifford as a witness.[10] The actual vote of 4 R. vs. 3 D. was on a substitute to continue rules under which witnesses were called on Jenkins' request. But Jenkins & Mundt promised Clifford would be called.

Before the vote, McCarthy insisted that he wanted Clifford to testify but opposed calling him. Although Symington demanded that Clifford appear, McCarthy said Symington had "deadly fear" lest Clifford be called.

Finally, Welch burst out: ". . . Sen. McCarthy, you have . . . something of a genius for creating confusion, throwing in new issues, new accusations and creating a turmoil in the hearts & minds of the country. . . ."

Welch, announcing his conviction that neither side could win a "100% clearcut victory," had agreed to limiting the calling of witnesses.

MISCELLANEOUS

Oldest Egyptian Tomb Found

The oldest known untouched tomb of an Egyptian pharaoh was uncovered June 3 at Sakkara by Dr. Mohammed Zakaria Ghoneim, chief inspector of Egyptian antiquities. The tomb was believed to be that of Sankhet who ruled about 2750 B.C.

The Sakkara tomb was about 20 mi. south of the Great Pyramid of Giza where a solar boat built for Pharaoh Cheops was unearthed May 26. The Egyptian Govt. set up a 5-man committee June 5 to supervise further investigation of the boat. Kamal el-Malakh, who made the find, was made lowest-ranking commission member.[11]

1—see Vol. XIII, p. 4M 2—p. 193B3 3—p. 185F1 4—p. 185F3 5—p. 194B1 6—p. 192D1 7—p. 184B2 8—p. 187F1 9—p. 187B3 10—p. 193C3 11—p. 188D2